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ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, people across the United 
States protested that “too big to jail” banks were not held accountable after the 
financial crisis. Little has changed. Newly collected data concerning enforcement 
during the Trump Administration has made it possible to assess what impact a se-
ries of new policies has had on corporate enforcement. To provide a snapshot 
comparison, in its last twenty months, the Obama Administration levied $14.15 
billion in total corporate penalties by prosecuting seventy-one financial institu-
tions and thirty-four public companies. During the first twenty months of the 
Trump Administration, corporate penalties declined to $3.4 billion in total penal-
ties, with seventeen financial institutions and thirteen public companies prose-
cuted. These trends build over time. In each year, blockbuster cases come and 
go, creating swings in fines. However, consistent with these data, this Article 
describes changes in written policy, practice, and informal statements from the 
Department of Justice that have cumulatively softened the federal approach to 
corporate criminals. This Article also describes continuity between administra-
tions. A rise in corporate declinations, for example, represents a continuation of 
Obama Administration policy. A decline in use of corporate monitors similarly 
reflects prior policy. The steady and low level of individual charging in corporate 
cases reflects an ongoing lack of success in efforts to prioritize individual prose-
cutions, exemplified by the 2015 “Yates Memo.” That policy, like others, has 
been formally relaxed. The series of DOJ corporate prosecution policy changes 
has also been accompanied by institutional shifts. For example, high-level vacan-
cies within the DOJ and other enforcement agencies may compromise ability to 
coordinate resolution of complex cases. This Article concludes by proposing 
structural changes, such as independent corporate enforcement functions, to 
enhance capacity and prevent pendulum shifts in enforcement. How we handle 
corporate crime goes to the root of power imbalances in the economy that pro-
duced the financial crisis. If we still have not learned the lessons of the last finan-
cial crisis, the next one cannot be far ahead.   
* L. Neil Williams Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Many thanks to Sam Buell, Kevin 
Davis, Martin Petrin, and Jed Purdy for conversations about this project and invaluable comments on earlier 
drafts, as well as participants in a presentation at University College London School of Law. I thank Paul 
Bryzyski, Benjamin Kramer, Leila Malek, Harrison Newman, Anna Raphael, and Callie Thomas for excellent 
research assistance, and Jon Ashley for his longtime collaboration in creating and maintaining the Duke and 
UVA Corporate Prosecution Registry that hosts these data. © 2019, Brandon L. Garrett. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate prosecution penalties are declining in the United States at the federal 
level, where the most significant and complex cases have long been brought.1 The 
corporate charging policies and practices of the Department of Justice have 
evolved over the past three decades.2 In the 1990s, large corporate prosecutions 
were a novel phenomenon.3 By the end of the decade, then-Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder cemented the growing importance of corporate prosecutions 
in a novel memo regarding charging corporate defendants.4 In the early 2000s, a 
new approach revolutionized corporate prosecutions, as the DOJ emphasized 
large-scale settlements using deferred and non-prosecution agreements.5 By 2015, 
federal prosecutors were charging more financial institutions than ever before.6 
Prosecutors began to use criminal statutes such as the Bank Secrecy Act and the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which had been neglected in the past.7 The 
changes were marked, albeit incremental, and were designed to strengthen corpo-
rate prosecutions.8 In 2017 and 2018, however, the DOJ made a series of policy 
changes designed to reduce the impact of criminal prosecution on corporations.9 
This Article presents a set of empirical analyses of changed practice and policy 
concerning corporate prosecutions. 
Comparing the penalties imposed in federal corporate prosecutions in the first 
twenty months of the Trump Administration with the penalties imposed in such 
cases in the last twenty months of the Obama Administration provides a snapshot 
of these changes. Updated data from the Duke and UVA Corporate Prosecution 
Registry show how corporate penalties have declined sharply, as have the numbers 
of prosecutions of public companies and financial institutions.10 
See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, U.VA. & DUKE U. CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY [hereinafter 
CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY], http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/index.html. 
This registry aims to provide the most complete resource available on federal organizational prosecution, 
While some 
1. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 55 
(2014) (providing an overview of the changing approach towards corporate prosecution during the 1990s).  
2. See id. at 55–56.  
3. See id. at 5, 55 (describing low average corporate penalties before 1994 and a rise in the 1990s, with a 
graphical illustration of the gradual rise in the 1990s). 
4. See id. at 54–56 (providing an overview of the changing approach towards corporate prosecution during the 
1990s).  
5. See id. at 55–56 (providing an overview of the changing approach towards corporate prosecution and trends 
in enforcement during the 2000s); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 888– 
89 (2007) (describing rise in use of compliance and rehabilitative approaches towards corporate 
prosecutions); see also Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron 
World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2006) (describing the 
move towards an inquisitorial system). 
6. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J. F. 33, 35 (2016) (detailing changing 
approach towards prosecution of financial institutions).  
7. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 63–64. 
8. Id. at 56 (describing goal to make federal corporate prosecutions more forceful and to more effectively 
obtain better results). 
9. See infra Part III.A. (summarizing six main policy changes adopted in 2017–18). 
10. 
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lawyers and journalists have commented on the changes in tone, policy, and out-
comes, others have disputed whether there has been a change.11 
A substantial New York Times piece developed data from several sources, including the Duke/UVA 
Registry, concerning civil and criminal corporate enforcement. See Danielle Ivory, Ben Protess & Robert Gebeloff, 
4 Takeaways From the Trump-Era Plunge in Corporate Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/11/05/us/trump-corporate-penalties-sec-justice.html; see also Rick Claypool, ‘Law and Order’ 
Trump is Soft on Corporate Crime and Wrongdoing, PR WATCH (July 30, 2018), https://www.prwatch.org/news/ 
2018/07/13374/law-order-trump-soft-corporate-crime-wrongdoing; James Lartey, Corporate Penalties Dropped As 
Much As 94% Under Trump, Study Says, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/ 
jul/25/trump-corporate-penalties-drop-public-citizen-study; Kadhim Shubber, Antitrust Prosecutions in US Fall to 
Lowest Level Since 1970s; FT Analysis, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/27a0a34e-f2a0- 
11e8-9623-d7f9881e729f; Victoria Graham, Jeff Sessions’ Corporate Friendly Approach Likely to Outlast Him, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/jeff-sessions-corporate- 
friendly-approach-likely-to-outlast-him-2; Jocelyn E. Strauber & Micah F. Fergenson, DOJ Policies Aim to Reduce 
Enforcement Burden on Cooperating Entities, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www. 
skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/01/2019-insights/doj-policies-aim-to-reduce-enforcement-burden. However, 
citing to Gibson & Dunn data, one commentator describes a rise in corporate criminal penalties. Christopher 
H. Casey, 2018 Data Show No Slowdown in Corporate Prosecution At DOJ, DUANE MORRIS (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://blogs.duanemorris.com/whitecollarcriminallaw/2019/01/16/2018-data-show-no-slowdown-in-corporate- 
prosecutions-at-doj. Yet, that report, as discussed infra note 39, relies on billions in fines paid by 
Petrobras to Brazilian authorities, in a case initiated in the prior Administration. The foreign portion of the 
penalty should not be considered towards 2018 totals, in my view, and further, it represents a legacy case 
that does not shed light on current DOJ priorities and practices. 
In early 2017, 
then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated that corporate misconduct would 
remain a central priority during his tenure, despite the changed focus on immigra-
tion, drug, and violent offenses.12 
See Matt Zapotosky, Sessions: Focus on Violent Crime Doesn’t Mean Lax Enforcement for White-Collar 
Offenses, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-focus-on- 
violent-crime-doesnt-mean-lax-enforcement-for-white-collar-offenses/2017/04/24/d36d4034-2906-11e7-be51- 
b3fc6ff7faee_story.html (describing how then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, speaking to an audience of 
compliance officers, emphasized that the new Administration would “still enforce the laws that protect 
American consumers and ensure that honest businesses are not placed at a disadvantage to dishonest 
businesses”). 
This Article provides the first empirical analysis 
of corporate prosecutions during the time period that followed. This empirical 
analysis describes a subsequent decline in corporate penalties and enforcement.13 
This decline was reflected in a series of policy changes, which this Article details 
in Parts I and II. Part I also describes changes in practice not necessarily reflected 
in policy, in which more lenient outcomes have resulted—particularly in cases 
involving banks. 
In Part II, this Article aims to assess whether changes imposed towards the end 
of the Obama Administration, some of which remain in place formally, have suc-
ceeded in reorienting prosecutors towards individual prosecutions. Past research 
has found that typically, individuals were not prosecuted accompanying corporate  
including declinations, acquittals, trial convictions, deferred and non-prosecution agreements, and plea 
agreements with corporations. 
11. 
12. 
13. See CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, supra note 10; see also infra Appendix A, Appendix B. 
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deferred and non-prosecution agreements.14 In response to criticism of the lack of 
individual accountability in corporate prosecution cases, the DOJ adopted the 
Yates Memo approach in Fall 2015 by focusing on individual investigation and 
prosecution in its corporate prosecution guidelines.15 
See Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum to Heads of Dep’t 
Components & U.S. Attorneys, Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, at 1 (Sept. 9, 2015) 
[hereinafter Yates Memo], http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download. For discussion of the Yates 
Memo, see Brandon L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 60, 61 (2016); Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines 
on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51 (2015); Gideon Mark, The Yates Memorandum, 
51 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1589 (2018). 
However, the Yates Memo 
changes were not retroactive.16 Four years since its adoption, one can now assess 
whether the policy changes have made an impact in practice. This Article details 
why there has been no noticeable increase in individual prosecutions. For the time 
period from 2001 to 2018, individuals were prosecuted alongside corporations 
entering deferred or non-prosecution agreements in 134 of the 497 total agree-
ments with organizations (or 27%).17 Moreover, the Trump Administration relaxed 
the application of the Yates Memo in a new set of amended guidelines adopted in 
Fall 2018, making less likely a future uptick in individual prosecutions accompa-
nying corporate prosecutions.18 
This Article also examines important respects with which corporate prosecution 
practices have been continuous across administrations. One change introduced in 
the Obama Administration was a novel form of declination in corporate cases. 
Companies that would otherwise be prosecuted were not prosecuted if they had 
substantially cooperated and self-reported.19 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN 
AND GUIDANCE (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386/download. 
The DOJ has now made that policy 
permanent.20 Other changes regarding the role of corporate compliance and moni-
torships similarly reflect prior practice. Under the Obama Administration, the DOJ 
increasingly emphasized rigorous review of corporate compliance programs. In 
February 2017, the DOJ’s Criminal Fraud Section produced new guidance on 
corporate compliance.21 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF CORP. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (Apr. 2019), https://www.justice. 
gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download. 
The Trump Administration declined to renew the 
Compliance Counsel who supervised that effort, but reissued and bolstered that 
14. See GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 83 (noting that individuals were prosecuted 
accompanying 89 of 255 agreements); Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 1789, 1853 (2015). 
15. 
16. Yates Memo, supra note 15, at 3 (“This guidance in this memo will apply to all future investigations of 
corporate wrongdoing. It will also apply to those matters pending as of the date of this memo[.]”). 
17. See infra Part II.B. 
18. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.210 (2018) [hereinafter U.S.A.M.]; Rod 
Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the American Conference Institute’s 35th 
International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2018) (“We want to focus on the 
individuals who play significant roles in setting a company on a course of criminal conduct. We want to know 
who authorized the misconduct, and what they knew about it.”). 
19. 
20. U.S.A.M. § 9-47.120. 
21. 
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guidance document.22 
Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at NYU School of Law 
Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement Conference on Achieving Effective Compliance (Oct. 12, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-brian-benczkowski-delivers-remarks-nyu- 
school-law-program. 
A policy adopted in October 2018 deemphasized appoint-
ment of monitors,23 but that change is more of a continuation of prior practice 
because monitor use had already been uncommon.24 
Part III turns towards an examination of the implications of six changes formally 
made to DOJ corporate enforcement policy as well as accompanying changes in 
corporate criminal enforcement practice. During the financial crisis, people across 
America protested that Wall Street banks, which were treated as “too big to fail,” 
were bailed out while individuals lost their homes, savings, and livelihoods.25 
See, e.g., David Dayen, Banks are Too Big to Fail Say . . . Conservatives?, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 21, 2013), 
https://prospect.org/power/banks-big-fail-say-. . .-conservatives (describing Tea Party and conservative academic 
concerns with bank bailouts and regulation); Curt Goering, Occupy Wall Street: If Banks are Too Big to Fail, are 
People Too Small to Matter?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/ 
2011/oct/17/occupy-wall-street-goering (describing the Occupy Wall Street movement). 
Critics also asked why “too big to jail” banks were not held accountable for 
crimes.26 
Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS (Jan. 9 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-
prosecutions
 
. See also J.S. Nelson, Paper Dragon Thieves, 105 GEO. L.J. 871, 873 (2017); Michael Rothfeld, 
Firms Get Penalized, but Many Workers Don’t, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/no- 
headline-available-1389905856. 
The result was a series of changes designed to make corporate prosecu-
tions more stringent.27 Now the pendulum has swung away from large-scale corpo-
rate prosecutions. Part III also describes how institutional features of the current 
Administration, including turnover and high-level vacancies at the DOJ and across 
federal agencies, have weakened enforcement. This Article seeks to document 
both to what degree that has occurred and how this has affected DOJ policy and 
practice. This Article concludes by asking why this has occurred and what the 
long-term effects may be, as well as their implications for corporate accountability 
more generally. 
One response to past corporate accountability crises has been to call for the DOJ 
to take the lead in generating criminal accountability for corporate crime.28 Doing 
so, however, relies on a non-independent agency that has politically-set priorities, 
even if its policies do maintain some consistency over time. In this area, there is 
more consistency in policy than in practice. Enforcement practices can change 
quite quickly as compared with policy. Enforcement that involves leniency or sim-
ply declining cases permits ready change as a path of least resistance. At the same 
time, the DOJ and U.S. Attorney’s Offices have prioritized bringing large quanti-
ties of relatively small individual immigration, firearms, and drug cases.29 Doing 
22. 
23. Id. 
24. See GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 175, 178. 
25. 
26. 
27. See Yates Memo, supra note 15. 
28. See Rakoff, supra note 26. 
29. See infra Part III.B. 
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so may have made it more difficult to muster resources for resource-intensive 
white collar and corporate matters.30 Yet, this discussion is not just a criticism of 
the Trump Administration’s declining corporate enforcement. In Part II, I describe 
both the ineffectiveness of the Obama-era Yates Memo and the rise in formal cor-
porate prosecution declinations under the Obama-era FCPA pilot program. 
The U.S. needs a permanent institutional structure for corporate investigation 
and prosecution. If no overall strategy exists, or if the strategy is to relax enforce-
ment, a new corporate crime wave may result. What measures can be taken to 
ensure more consistency across administrations? Lessons can be learned from 
areas within the DOJ that have experienced more stable enforcement patterns. 
Following the model of the Antitrust Division and the Criminal Fraud Section unit 
that focuses on FCPA cases—which each have dedicated resources and staffing— 
could help to ensure enforcement consistency over time.31 Other countries, includ-
ing France and Ireland, have recently created corporate prosecution agencies or 
commissions explicitly rejecting the U.S.-style approach in which prosecutors 
hold the reins in corporate prosecutions.32 While any such entity will still be sub-
ject to resource constraints, prosecutorial discretion, and policy shifts, a standing 
entity would better weather the types of pendulum swings we are now seeing in 
corporate enforcement. Independent enforcement resources are needed in order to 
maintain a more considered and consistent level of corporate accountability. 
I. THE DECLINE IN CORPORATE CRIMINAL PENALTIES
This Part describes new data from the Duke and UVA Corporate Prosecution 
Registry regarding all corporate prosecutions from 2001 to present. It focuses on 
the beginning of the Trump Administration compared with the end of the Obama 
Administration, and the similar transition period from the Bush to Obama 
Administration. Part A describes the decline in corporate penalties in 2017 and 
2018. The sections that follow describe trends that were already underway during 
the Obama Administration. Part B describes the rise in a novel type of corporate 
declination from the Obama Administration in which cases that would otherwise 
be prosecuted are publicly declined. Part C describes trends in bank prosecutions. 
Part D describes changing approaches towards compliance and a new policy on 
prosecutors’ use of corporate monitorships, with a new emphasis on avoiding the 
appointment of such monitors. 
A. Corporate Prosecution Data
Comparing the last twenty months of the Obama Administration with the 
first eighteen months of the Trump Administration reveals substantial changes in 
corporate prosecutions. It was telling that in the weeks just before the Trump 
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See infra Part III.D.
32. See infra Part III.D.
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inauguration, prosecutors announced a remarkable string of massive corporate pros-
ecution settlements. Almost two billion dollars in corporate penalties were 
announced, including a $710 million plea with Barclays, a $395 million plea with 
Royal Bank of Scotland, and a $586 million plea with Western Union.33 
See CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, Barclays PLC, https://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate- 
prosecution-registry/detail-files/3071.html; CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), http:// 
lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/detail-files/3071.html; CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, 
Western Union Co., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/detail-files/3059.html. 
The total 
for the last twenty months of the Obama Administration was a remarkable $14.15 
billion in total corporate penalties, with seventy-one financial institutions and 
thirty-four public companies prosecuted.34 Those figures include corporate cases 
finalized during the waning days of the Administration. After Trump’s inaugura-
tion, the vast majority of the corporate penalties imposed in criminal cases were 
imposed in 2017, and each was an Obama Administration legacy case. The largest 
such case was the $2.8 billion penalty in the Volkswagen A.G. prosecution concern-
ing emissions fraud, which was initially filed in 2016.35 In 2017, an FCPA case 
against Telia involving bribes to the Uzbek government resulted in a $548 million 
penalty, but the case was related to a set of cases involving the Amsterdam-based 
company Vimpelcom that were settled in 2016.36 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Telia Company AB and Its Uzbek Subsidiary Enter Into a Global 
Foreign Bribery Resolution of More Than $965 Million for Corrupt Payments in Uzbekistan (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telia-company-ab-and-its-uzbek-subsidiary-enter-global-foreign-bribery-resolution- 
more-965. 
Thus, although the DOJ imposed 
over $10 billion in corporate penalties in 2017, the bulk were imposed in a few leg-
acy cases along with blockbuster cases finalized in the last weeks of the Obama 
Administration. 
During the first twenty months of the Trump Administration, excluding the leg-
acy cases filed prior to January 20, 2017, the decline is clearer: total corporate pen-
alties declined to $3.4 billion, with seventeen financial institutions and thirteen 
public companies prosecuted.37 The decline is also apparent when viewing 2018 
corporate penalties in Figure 1 below, since by 2018 there were fewer legacy 
cases.38 More sobering is the fact that most of the cases with large penalties in the 
first twenty months of the Trump Administration were legacy cases that had been 
initiated and investigated under the Obama Administration.39 
33. 
34. See infra Appendix A. 
35. Judgment in a Criminal Case for Organizational Defendants, United States v. Volkswagen AG, No. 2:16- 
cr-20394 (E.D. Mich. 2017), at 4. 
36. 
37. See infra Appendix B. 
38. It is important to note that these trends build over time, and blockbuster cases come and go each year, 
often creating swings in fines. 
39. 
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These figures include only the fines paid to federal prosecutors in the United States. Thus, the Gibson Dunn 
figures show much greater penalties in 2018, since they count in the Petrobras case the vast bulk of the penalties, which 
were paid to authorities in Brazil. F. Joseph Warin et al., Gibson Dunn Offers Year-End Update on Corporate Non- 
Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 19, 2019), http://clsbluesky.law. 
columbia.edu/2019/01/21/gibson-dunn-offers-year-end-update-on-corporate-non-prosecution-and-deferred-prosecution- 
agreements. These figures do not include such sums, because although U.S. prosecutors may closely cooperate 
with foreign prosecutors, sums paid to those prosecutors are not U.S. penalties, and they may additionally reflect 
separate criminal violations abroad and harm caused to victims in foreign counties. 
Corporate enforcement may be returning to the levels from ten years ago, just 
before the financial crisis. However, while the trend reflects the declining size of 
aggregate corporate penalties, it is not as sharp when one examines instead the 
number of cases filed. There continue to be many dozens of very small, chiefly 
environmental, corporate criminal cases. Antitrust and FCPA matters continue to 
be brought in similar numbers as in the past.40 The larger cases involving public 
companies and financial institutions, however, have been reduced, as have the pen-
alties imposed in such cases.41 
Also noteworthy and easily visible in Figure 1 is that there was no noticeable 
change during the transition from the George W. Bush DOJ to the Obama DOJ. 
Corporate fines were steadily increasing before and after the period from 2007 to 
2008, and they continued to do so in the early years of the new Administration. 
During that time period, the DOJ corporate prosecution policy did not change; pol-
icy changes were only gradually introduced in the years to come. Nor was it a dis-
ruptive transition; there was early and orderly transition planning, and the Bush 
Administration cooperated in the transition to an unusual degree.43 
Figure 1. Corporate Criminal Penalties, 2001–2018 
Data from Duke / UVA Corporate Prosecution Registry42 
40. See infra Appendix A. 
41. See infra Appendix A. 
42. See CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, supra note 10. 
43. Martha Joynt Kumar, The 2008-2009 Presidential Transition Through the Voices of Its Participants, 39 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 823, 825 (2009) (describing how “unprecedented early transition planning and actions 
by the George W. Bush administration led to a new level of cooperation between the outgoing and incoming 
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The reduced federal corporate criminal penalties should come as no surprise 
given statements by current DOJ officials on financial penalties imposed on corpo-
rations. For example, in a March 2018 speech, then-Deputy Attorney General Rod 
Rosenstein stated the desire that in corporate prosecutions, prosecutors should 
“avoid imposing penalties that disproportionately punish innocent employees, 
shareholders, customers and other stakeholders.”44 
Ben Protess, Robert Gebeloff & Danielle Ivory, Trump Administration Spares Corporate Wrongdoers 
Billions in Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/trump-sec-doj- 
corporate-penalties.html. 
Such comments suggest that fi-
nancial penalties are no longer a priority in the same way as in the past. Reflecting 
those remarks, the DOJ then announced a policy in May 2018 to discourage “piling 
on” of fines, where a company might pay fines to multiple enforcers.45 
Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks to the New York City Bar White 
Collar Crime Institute (May 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod- 
rosenstein-delivers-remarks-new-york-city-bar-white-collar. 
A company 
may have committed crimes that impacted victims or the public in multiple juris-
dictions. The DOJ was therefore careful to say that multiple payments in these 
cases may be justified.46 Yet there had been no policy in need of correction that 
permitted duplicate penalties in the past. Indeed, regulatory agencies cannot 
impose the types of punitive fines that prosecutors can impose in criminal cases. In 
FCPA cases, for example, the SEC may impose disgorgement remedies, but the 
SEC is not statutorily authorized to impose non-civil penalties.47 It is not necessar-
ily “piling on” for prosecutors to separately impose a fine; it may permit a more 
comprehensive remedy. 
One area in which enforcement has been more stable is in FCPA cases. 
Observers of FCPA activity have correctly described how penalties have 
increased over time, counter to the trend in corporate enforcement overall.48 
Lucinda Low, Brittany Prelogar & John London, Insight: FCPA Penalties on Track for Potential Record 
in 2019, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 22, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/insight- 
fcpa-penalties-on-track-for-potential-record-in-2019. 
The 
FCPA anti-bribery provisions make it a federal crime to corruptly offer or pro-
vide anything of value to officials of foreign governments or related foreign enti-
ties with the intent to obtain or retain business.49 In 2018, there were record 
penalties in FCPA matters, with particularly large penalties in the Petrobras, 
Société Générale, and Panasonic cases.50 
Richard L. Cassin, 2018 FCPA Enforcement Index, THE FCPA BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), http://www.fcpablog. 
com/blog/2019/1/2/2018-fcpa-enforcement-index.html. 
Why were penalties growing in that  
administrations,” and “assignment of experienced and knowledgeable people to handle studies of White House 




47. 15 U.S.C. § 7h-1(e) (providing SEC authority to impose disgorgement); 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g) (providing 
SEC authority to impose monetary penalties). 
48. 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (U.S. persons); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (foreign persons). 
50. 
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context and declining in others? Some of those cases, like the Petrobras case, may 
have been in the pipeline for some time. For instance, the Petrobras case originated 
from the “Operation Car Wash” investigations in Brazil that began four years ear-
lier in 2014.51 
Linda Pressly, ‘The Largest Foreign Bribery Case in History’, BBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www. 
bbc.com/news/business-43825294. 
However, another reason more continuity in FCPA enforcement may occur is 
institutional and resource-based. Main Justice has exclusive authority to enforce 
the criminal provisions of the FCPA.52 To do so, the DOJ Criminal Fraud Section 
has a dedicated FCPA Unit.53 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD SECTION YEAR IN REVIEW 2017, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/ 
file/1026996/download. 
That Unit notably expanded toward the end of the 
Obama Administration; it added ten prosecutors in 2016, doubling the size of the 
unit, while the FBI created three squads of agents focused on FCPA matters.54 
That capacity may explain why FCPA prosecutions have persisted. Nor have poli-
cies in the FCPA shifted under the new Administration; the only change has been 
to make permanent a pilot program initiated in the Obama Administration.55 There 
has been continuity in policy and in practice. 
However, in corporate charging generally, the tenor of the new federal approach 
has been that prosecutors should be taking pains to penalize corporate criminals 
less.56 
See Kadhim Shubber, Rod Rosenstein Leaves Lighter Burden on Companies at DOJ, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 21, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/ff8e63f4-198d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3. 
At the time the DOJ announced the new policy to avoid “piling on,” Deputy 
Attorney General Rosenstein stated that actual results in enforcement count when 
deterring corporate crime: “The Department’s rhetoric gets a lot of attention—the 
policy memos and speeches. But performance matters most.”57 As Figure 1 illus-
trates, if performance does matter, then it should matter that the DOJ’s corporate 
penalties have plummeted. 
B. The New Corporate Declinations 
One simple reason that corporate penalties are declining is that in large cases, 
the DOJ increasingly declines to file charges. Importantly, these are not traditional 
declinations in which prosecutors decide that they do not have sufficient evidence 
or cause to pursue a criminal matter further. Such declinations are typically not  
51. 
52. U.S.A.M. § 9-47-110. 
53. 
54. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN 
AND GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1 (“[T]he Fraud Section is increasing its FCPA unit by more than 50% by 
adding 10 more prosecutors to its ranks.”); see also Mayling C. Blanco et al., FCPA Under the New 
Administration, BLANK ROME LLP WHITE COLLAR WATCH, July 2017, at 8. 
55. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
56. 
57. Rod Rosenstein, Remarks to the New York City Bar White Collar Crime Institute, supra note 45. 
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made public, since disclosing that an investigation was initiated but then termi-
nated would harm the reputation of an innocent party.58 
The DOJ has defined a new type of declination in the corporate setting in which 
a case has merit, but is not pursued. Such a declination, the DOJ explains, should 
be used in “a case that would have been prosecuted or criminally resolved except 
for the company’s voluntary disclosure, full cooperation, remediation, and pay-
ment of disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or restitution.”59 Thus, a corporate case that 
has merit and would have resulted in a conviction if pursued, is dropped. Under 
this policy, declinations may be made public; some (thirteen as of this writing) are 
listed on the DOJ website,60 
The Criminal Fraud Section maintains a list of its FCPA declinations on its website. See U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, Declinations, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/pilot-program/ 
declinations. 
but other, more traditional declinations are not made 
public when they are part of a closed investigation.61 
Marc A. Bohn & James G. Tillen, Evaluating FCPA Pilot Program: Declinations on the Rise, LAW360 
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/905127/evaluating-fcpa-pilot-program-declinations-on-the- 
rise. In the past, declinations in FCPA matters had not normally been made public. See Mark, supra note 15, at 
1647. For examples of such declinations involving closed investigations, see Richard Cassin, 2018 FCPA 
Enforcement Index, THE FCPA BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2019/1/2/2018-fcpa- 
enforcement-index.html. 
The declinations do not 
always just state that charges were declined, either. They can include statements of 
facts describing criminal acts62 
Bruce E. Yannett, Andrew M. Levine & Philip Rohlik, The Difficulty of Defining a Declination: An Update 
on the DOJ’s Pilot Program, NYU COMPLIANCE & ENF’T BLOG (Nov. 16, 2016), https://wp.nyu.edu/ 
compliance_enforcement/2016/11/16/the-difficulty-of-defining-a-declination-an-update-on-the-dojs-pilot-program. 
or payments of disgorgement.63 Consequently, it 
can be a fine line between a non-prosecution agreement and a declination. 
Yet another change to DOJ policy on corporate prosecutions was to decline all 
criminal charges against fully cooperating corporations accused of foreign bribery 
violations. This policy, announced in Spring 2018, prohibits prosecutors from fil-
ing charges if they find that a company sufficiently cooperated and reported their 
crimes.64 The four factors to be considered are: (1) voluntary self-disclosure; 
(2) full cooperation with the DOJ; (3) remediation; and (4) disgorgement of ill- 
gotten gains.65 Such declinations have begun to mount in FCPA matters, including 
in cases involving major companies like Johnson Controls and Dun & Bradstreet.66 
During the first year of the pilot program, which began in 2016, five companies 
58. Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of 
Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1453, 1497–98 (2004); see also Richard S. Frase, The Decision 
to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 247 
n.7 (1980). 




63. See id. (“The benefits of a Pilot Program declination are therefore muted by the requirement to pay 
disgorgement[.]”). 
64. U.S.A.M. § 9-47.120. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. For criticism of the pilot program, see Mike Koehler, Grading the DOJ’s Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act ‘Pilot Program’, 11 BLOOMBERG BNA WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 353, 354 (2016); Mark, supra 
note 15, at 1642 (“[T]he two incentives that the Pilot Program offered were nothing new. The DOJ had 
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received declinations in FCPA cases.67 Each was required to disgorge profits but 
otherwise received no penalty.68 Some of those cases involved conduct by Chinese 
subsidiaries,69 and thus U.S. jurisdiction might have been difficult to assert. 
In November 2017, the DOJ announced a new FCPA corporate enforcement 
policy, making permanent the prior pilot program.70 These new guidelines 
extended declinations to corporations that self-report conduct in a timely manner 
that prosecutors were not previously aware of.71 In addition, these companies must 
fully cooperate and appropriately remediate.72 The Deputy Attorney General 
explained: “[w]e expect the new policy to reassure corporations that want to do the 
right thing. It will increase the volume of voluntary disclosures, and enhance our 
ability to identify and punish culpable individuals.”73 
Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 34th International Conference 
on the Foreign Corrupt Practice (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general- 
rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-international-conference-foreign. 
The pilot program would 
“increase the Fraud Section’s ability to prosecute individual wrongdoers whose 
conduct might otherwise have gone undiscovered or been impossible to prove.”74 
As discussed in the next Part, there is no evidence that the pilot program has had 
such an effect. 
Also notable about the declinations in FCPA cases is that they ostensibly reward 
enhanced “full” cooperation, but the only case declined to date—the Cognizant 
case—involved charges against individuals.75 Johnson Controls, for example, 
received a declination in 2016, lauding its “provision of all known relevant facts 
about the individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct.”76 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Declination Letter, Johnson Controls, Inc., June 21, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal-fraud/file/874566/download. 
Yet, its 
Chinese subsidiary had previously settled an FCPA matter involving its York  
previously offered companies that voluntarily disclosed, cooperated, and remediated up to and sometimes more 
than a 50% reduction from the minimum amount suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines.”). 
67. Mark, supra note 15, at 1645 (summarizing enforcement during first year of the pilot program). 
68. Id. 
69. Andrew M. Levine et al., Early Thoughts on the DOJ’s Pilot Program, the Continued Breadth of the 
Accounting Provisions, and Possible Implications for Self-Reporting, 7 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON FCPA UPDATE 
14, 20–21 (2016). 
70. See U.S.A.M. § 9-47.120. 
71. See id. § 9-47.120(1). 
72. See id. § 9-47.120(1). 
73. 
74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN 
AND GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 2. 
75. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former President and Former Chief Legal Officer Of Publicly Traded 
Fortune 200 Technology Services Company Indicted in Connection with Alleged Multi-Million Dollar Foreign 
Bribery Scheme (Feb. 15, 2019) (“A federal grand jury returned an indictment yesterday against the former 
president and the former chief legal officer of Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation, a publicly traded 
Fortune 200 technology services company based in Teaneck, New Jersey, in connection with an alleged foreign 
bribery scheme.”). 
76. 
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International subsidiary in 2007.77 
See CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, York Int’l Corp., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate- 
prosecution-registry/detail-files/135.html. 
In the 2016 case, the DOJ noted that Johnson 
Controls had “separat[ed] from the Company all 16 employees found to be 
involved in the misconduct, including high-level executives at the Chinese subsidi-
ary.”78 Perhaps there were no relevant employees over which prosecutors could 
obtain jurisdiction. In the Petrobras case, forty-two individuals were charged in 
Brazil, but none in the United States. This may be appropriate where the bulk of 
the corporate fines were paid to authorities in Brazil and the conduct was centered 
in Brazil.79 
Brazil Prosecutors Charge 42 People in Alleged Petrobras Bribery Scheme, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption/brazil-prosecutors-charge-42-people-in-alleged-petrobras- 
bribery-scheme-idUSKCN1OK2A8. 
In March 2018, the DOJ apparently began to extend the new declination 
approach to all corporate prosecutions beyond FCPA matters. Barclays Bank 
received a declination in a case involving “frontrunning” conduct in foreign 
exchange transactions with Hewlett Packard.80 
Benjamin D. Singer, Chief, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Letter to Alexander J. 
Willscher, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1039791/ 
download. 
As a DOJ official explained, 
“[w]hen a company discovers corporate misconduct and quickly raises its hand 
and tells us about it, that says something. It shows the company is taking miscon-
duct seriously and not willing to tolerate it. And we are rewarding those good deci-
sions.”81 
Jody Godoy, DOJ Expands Leniency Beyond FCPA, Lets Barclays Off, LAW360 (Mar. 1, 2018), https:// 
www.law360.com/articles/1017798/doj-expands-leniency-beyond-fcpa-lets-barclays-off. 
The explanation did not make clear why a declination was needed to 
supply the appropriate reward for self-reporting, however. After all, while this par-
ticular case was limited to a single corporate victim who received restitution, 
Barclays had repeatedly been prosecuted and settled multiple criminal actions in 
recent years.82 
See CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, Barclays Bank, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution- 
registry/detail-files/575.html; CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, Barclays Bank PLC, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/ 
corporate-prosecution-registry/detail-files/658.html; CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, Barclays PLC, http://lib.law. 
virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/detail-files/3072.html. 
Individual criminal offenders do not benefit from any leniency- 
oriented policy of that type; they must provide substantial cooperation to receive 
sentencing reductions, not outright declinations.83 Nor was it clear in that case that 
individual offenders would be prosecuted. Indeed, a Barclays trader, along with 
traders at other banks, had been acquitted in prior federal trials.84 
77. 





83. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5K1.1 (2012) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. 
84. 
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Jonathan Stempel, In Rare Move, U.S. Judge Orders Acquittal of Barclays Currency Trader, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/barclays-trader/in-rare-move-u-s-judge-orders-acquittal-of-barclays-currency- 
trader-idUSL1N20R0Y5; see also Bob Van Voris, Lananh Nguyen & Chris Dolmetsch, British Cartel Traders 
Acquitted of Rigging Currency Market, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-10-26/jury-rejects-charge-that-chatroom-was-used-to-fix-fx-prices. 
To date, the new corporate declination policy has not been applied further to 
non-FCPA cases. It remains to be seen whether more types of corporate crimes 
will be eligible for declinations under the new approach. This shift means that still- 
more-lenient declinations for corporate crimes are now displacing non-prosecution 
agreements. 
C. Bank Settlements 
Perhaps no criminal law topic had a higher profile after the financial crisis than 
whether banks and bank executives would be held criminally accountable.85 In the 
years after the crisis, the DOJ’s approach towards banks noticeably changed. Far 
larger numbers of banks were prosecuted, fines grew dramatically, and banks 
pleaded guilty rather than receiving deferred or non-prosecution agreements as in 
the past.86 Plea agreements with banks involved penalties that broke records for the 
largest fines ever imposed in criminal cases in the U.S., namely the almost $9 bil-
lion total penalty French bank BNP Paribas paid as part of its plea for sanctions 
violations.87 
Plea Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Karen Patton Seymour, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, United 
States v. BNP Paribas S.A. (June 27, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2014/06/30/ 
plea-agreement.pdf. For analysis regarding how that fine amount was calculated, see Garrett, The Rise of Bank 
Prosecutions, supra note 6, at 39–40. 
Although there has been no formal policy change, the practice appears 
to have changed quite a bit. As noted above, fewer prosecutions of banks have 
been brought since 2017. Furthermore, in the last twenty months of the Obama 
Administration, seventy-one financial institutions were prosecuted, while during 
the first twenty months of the Trump Administration, seventeen financial institu-
tions were prosecuted.88 
Figure 2 below displays penalties in corporate prosecutions involving financial 
institutions. Since 2015, the fines have declined markedly. The bulk of the penal-
ties in 2017 were legacy cases, and the UBS, RBS, Barclays, JPMorgan, and 
Citicorp cases involved currency manipulation-related charges.89 Eliminating 
those cases from the total in 2017 would make the decline even more stark. When 
accounting for the legacy cases that resolved themselves in 2018, penalties have 
reached their lowest level since 2011. To be sure, aggregate corporate penalties 
are still higher than they were before 2008, as one can see in Figure 2 below. 
Penalties in the tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars are still levied.90 The 
blockbuster multi-billion-dollar penalties imposed upon financial institutions, 
though, are not part of this picture.91 Compare the transition from the George W. 
Bush Administration to the Barack Obama Administration. When one examines 
85. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 26. 
86. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, supra note 6, at 35–39. 
87. 
88. See infra Appendix B. 
89. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, supra note 6, at 42 n.32, 43. 
90. See infra Appendix A, Appendix B. 
91. See infra Appendix B. 
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Figure 2, it is clear that there was a decline in corporate penalties in 2008, and the 
2007-2008 period was the height of financial crisis. During the 2009 transition 
year, however, a sustained rise in corporate penalties began. 
Figure 2. Federal Financial Institution Criminal Penalties, 2001–201892 
One sensible reaction to these data is that corporate misconduct can come and 
go, and that much of the rise in fines post-2008 was in response to the financial cri-
sis. It may also be argued that there may be less corporate crime today than there 
was a decade ago. The rates of corporate crime are very difficult to know anything 
about. Crimes like fraud by their nature rely on deceit and intention, and therefore 
tend to go undetected.93 
In the past two years, cases that could have been significant were resolved in a 
manner that appears highly lenient by the standards of DOJ practice over the past 
decade. A few examples from settlements with financial institutions show that not 
only have the number of cases involving banks and fines declined, but also that the 
approach has become even more lenient towards corporate criminals, including 
banks. In May 2017, the first criminal prosecution was settled with a bank under the 
Trump Administration.94 
CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, Banamex USA, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution- 
registry/detail-files/3152.html; Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Citigroup Agrees to $97.4 Million Settlement in 
Money Laundering Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/business/dealbook/ 
citigroup-settlement-banamex-usa-inquiry.html. 
Federal prosecutors settled a money laundering case with 
Banamex, a defunct subsidiary of Citibank, with a non-prosecution agreement.95 In  
92. Data depicted here is available on the CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, supra note 10; see also infra 
Appendix A, Appendix B. 
93. See GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at Ch.3. 
94. 
95. Corkery & Protess, supra note 94. 
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that case, the bank forfeited $97 million dollars.96 The DOJ described a wholesale 
failure to prevent money laundering at Banamex subsidiary; for example, of 
18,000 suspicious transactions, fewer than ten were investigated and only nine 
were accompanied by required reports.97 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice, Banamex USA Agrees to Forfeit $97 Million 
in Connection with Bank Secrecy Act Violations (May 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/banamex-usa- 
agrees-forfeit-97-million-connection-bank-secrecy-act-violations. 
But the DOJ emphasized a “number of 
factors” justifying the non-prosecution, including how well the bank had cooper-
ated with the investigation, and other investigations of individual officers and 
employees.98 No criminal charges were filed against the bank itself or against any 
individuals. 
A second sign of increased leniency was the handling of HSBC, the large multi-
national bank based in the U.K. In January 2018, HSBC settled a new deferred 
prosecution agreement over rigging currency transactions by paying $101.5 mil-
lion in fines.99 
Jonathan Stempel & Sangameswaran S, HSBC to Pay $100 Mln to Settle U.S. Probe into Currency 
Rigging, REUTERS (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-settlement/hsbc-to-pay-100-mln-to- 
settle-u-s-probe-into-currency-rigging-idUSKBN1F739N. 
The reduced fine in that case reflected “extensive remediation” by 
the bank.100 What made the timing of the HSBC agreement particularly surprising, 
if not uncanny, was that its five-year federal monitorship for massive money laun-
dering and other criminal violations ended just a month earlier.101 
See Stempel & Sangameswaran, supra note 99; see also Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC 
to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges of Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012), https://dealbook. 
nytimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbc-said-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over-money-laundering. 
The prior case 
was a flashpoint—HSBC had become synonymous with “too big to jail” handling 
of bank misconduct.102 
For criticism, see, e.g., Press Release, Senator Charles Grassley, Grassley: Justice Department’s Failure to 
Prosecute Criminal Behavior in HSBC Scandal is Inexcusable (Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/ 
news-releases/grassley-justice-department’s-failure-prosecute-criminal-behavior-hsbc-scandal; Press Release, Senator 
Jeff Merkley, Merkley Blasts “Too Big to Jail” Policy for Lawbreaking Banks (Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.merkley. 
senate.gov/news/press-releases/merkley-blasts-too-big-to-jail-policy-for-lawbreaking-banks. 
HSBC paid a $1.9 billion fine—a record at the time—but 
no employees or officers were prosecuted and the bank avoided a conviction. Nor 
was the five years of monitorship a quiet period. During that period, HSBC suc-
cessfully opposed release of the corporate monitor’s reports, which criticized the 
company’s compliance efforts.103 
For example, HSBC’s 2015 Annual Report noted that the Monitor “expressed significant concerns about 
the pace of that progress, instances of potential financial crime and systems and controls deficiencies.” Frances 
Coppola, HSBC’s Catalogue of Lawsuits, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/ 
2016/02/28/hsbcs-catalog-of-lawsuits/#6860530457fc. This author wrote an amicus brief unsuccessfully arguing 
for the public interest in the release of the monitor report in question. Brief for Professor Brandon L. Garrett as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16- 
0308-cr(L)). 
This made it particularly concerning that within weeks of being let off the hook, 
it received yet another deal for yet another crime—and praise for its compliance. 
96. Id. 
97. 
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When the monitorship concluded, the CEO commented that “HSBC is able to 
combat financial crime much more effectively today as the result of the significant 
reforms we have implemented over the last five years.”104 
Stephen Morris, HSBC Escapes Prosecution as U.S. Ends 5-Year Deferred Deal, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 
11, 2017), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-law/hsbc-escapes-prosecution-as-us-ends-5-year-deferred- 
deal. 
But while DOJ con-
cluded that HSBC had “lived up to all of its commitments” under the deferred pros-
ecution agreement,105 the new $100 million fine was not the last. In October 2018, 
HSBC paid $765 million in fines to settle another civil agreement regarding pre- 
crisis mortgage practices.106 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Agrees to Pay $765 Million in Connection with Its Sale of 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-co/pr/hsbc-agrees-pay- 
765-million-connection-its-sale-residential-mortgage-backed-securities. 
The U.S. Attorney for the District of Colorado 
explained: 
HSBC chose to use a due diligence process it knew from the start didn’t work. 
It chose to put lots of defective mortgages into its deals. When HSBC saw 
problems, it chose to rush those deals out the door. When deals went south, 
investors who trusted HSBC suffered. And when the mortgages failed, com-
munities across the country were blighted by foreclosure. If you make choices 
like this, beware. You will pay.107 
Both Citibank and HSBC have been prosecuted many times in serious cases 
over the last decade. They are recidivists, but they do not receive harsher penalties 
despite their growing criminal records. This is not new. As bank prosecutions 
mounted before this more recent decline, the same banks settled multiple criminal 
cases without any evidence that they were treated as recidivists or found to have 
breached prior criminal settlements.108 Individual criminal defendants are not so 
lucky. 
D. Decline in Corporate Monitorships 
The organizational sentencing guidelines emphasize compliance that is audited 
or assessed.109 In February 2017 towards the end of the Obama Administration, the 
DOJ hired a Compliance Counsel who issued guidance titled “Evaluation of 
Corporate Compliance Programs.”110 
Keeping Current: DOJ Released Under-the-Radar Paper on “Evaluation of Corporate Compliance 
Programs”, AM. BAR. ASS’N (March 23, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/ 
blt/2017/03/keeping_current/. 
This guidance sought to add more rigor to 





108. See Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, supra note 6, at 41–43 (describing nine banks that have 
settled multiple prosecutions, and noting that of those, the only one formally treated as a recidivist, UBS, was 
credited for its cooperation and received a more lenient outcome than the other banks in the LIBOR settlements). 
109. See U.S.S.G. § 8B2.1(b) (2004). 
110. 
111. Id. 
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memorandum, but rather a list of “common questions” and “sample topics” that 
nevertheless emphasized that prosecutors must make an “individualized determi-
nation” about whether a company’s compliance deserved credit.112 The 
Compliance Counsel left early in the Trump Administration, and has not been 
replaced.113 However, the Criminal Division updated its guidance in April 2019, 
producing a far more detailed document.114 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (Apr. 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download. 
The document did not mark a new 
direction, but rather provided a lengthier description of existing criteria for evaluat-
ing compliance programs.115 
In recent years, policy has cemented the already declining use of corporate mon-
itorships to supervise compliance by corporations that settle prosecutions. One 
way that prosecutors have sought to supervise compliance at firms with particu-
larly dire compliance needs was to appoint corporate monitors.116 Monitors do not 
serve as the firm’s client, but rather report their findings regarding compliance to 
both prosecutors and the company, and make recommendations for improvements 
during their period of oversight.117 These monitorships typically last two to three 
years, and occur as part of a plea agreement or special condition of probation for a 
corporation.118 But monitorships have never been commonplace. 
A study found that only one-quarter of deferred and non-prosecution agreements 
from 2001 to 2012 called for the appointment of an independent monitor to super-
vise compliance.119 These monitorships were more common in certain areas, such 
as FCPA settlements.120 They are also commonly used in probation in environmen-
tal prosecutions.121 On the whole, however, monitorships have not always been 
effectively defined and their role has been largely criticized. Corporations bridle at 
the expense of retaining monitorship teams, and there is a lack of clarity in the 
scope and responsibilities of the monitorships.122 Yet there is a broader question as 
112. Id. 
113. Brian A. Benczkowski, Remarks at NYU School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and 
Enforcement Conference on Achieving Effective Compliance, supra note 22. 
114. 
115. Id. 
116. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at Ch.7; see also Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. 
Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1714 (2007). 
117. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at Ch.7. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 174. 
120. Id. at 177. 
121. Id. at 178. 
122. Eileen R. Larence, Director Homeland Security & Justice, Gov’t Accountability Off., Statement on 
Preliminary Observations on DOJ’s Use and Oversight of Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements (June 25, 2009), at 28 (describing criticism concerning monitorship cost and the lack of work plans 
for monitorships); Vikramaditya Khanna, Reforming the Corporate Monitor?, in PROSECUTORS IN THE 
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 226, 238–41, 244 (Anthony S. 
Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); Christie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve 
Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 732–34 (2009). 
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to why monitors are often not appointed if prosecutors target corporations specifi-
cally because their compliance programs are ineffective.123 
Absent a monitor, prosecutors must depend on the corporation’s own representa-
tions as to its improved compliance. In other areas, prosecutors have long insisted 
on routine monitoring in a highly publicized fashion where monitors’ reports for 
consent decrees are introduced in court and made available publicly for review and 
input by stakeholders.124 In corporate prosecutions, however, the process is typi-
cally not transparent.125 
The Deputy Attorney General announced in October 2018 that compliance in 
the form of independent monitor supervision should be used more selectively,126 
issuing a new memorandum that explained this change.127 
Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Selection of Monitors in Criminal 
Division Matters (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1100366/download. 
The new guidelines 
include some helpful ground rules and procedures, but suggest that often a monitor 
“will not be necessary” barring some “demonstrated need.”128 A monitor should 
only be appointed, the new guidelines state, if there are pervasive compliance 
problems and a company has not made serious investments in improving its com-
pliance that have been tested and deemed effective.129 Incentivizing corporate 
investment in compliance that can prevent serious crimes is desirable. 
The prior memorandum on this topic, known as the Morford Memo, had already 
emphasized two broad factors: the benefits of a monitorship and the costs to a cor-
poration.130 The new memo states that prosecutors should ask “whether remedial 
improvements to the compliance program and internal controls have been tested to 
demonstrate that they would prevent or detect similar misconduct in the future.”131 
The addition of this factor is valuable, but how compliance is to be tested appears 
nowhere in the memo. Instead, the memo contains many pages detailing how mon-
itors are to be selected using an internal DOJ Standing Committee on the Selection 
of Monitors.132 These can be high-paid positions. The selection process was meant 
to remediate longstanding cronyism concerns that there was insufficient vetting 
and that many insider former prosecutors secured lucrative positions as 
123. See GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 174–75. 
124. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1509, 1511 
(2017). 
125. For a discussion of this problem, see id. 
126. Brian A. Benczkowski, Remarks at NYU School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and 
Enforcement Conference on Achieving Effective Compliance, supra note 22. 
127. 
128. Id. at 2. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. That concept of testing compliance is not mentioned elsewhere in the memorandum, however, after 
the factor is briefly set out. Another change was that the memo states that its principles apply not just to deferred 
and non-prosecution agreements, but also to plea agreements in which monitors are appointed. Id. at 3. That 
change does not comport with the role that a judge plays in selecting and overseeing any monitor appointed as 
part of corporate probation. 
132. Id. at 3–8. 
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monitors.133 It would be far simpler for a judge to make the final decisions regard-
ing the appointment of monitors by selecting a monitor from candidates suggested 
by the prosecutor and defendant. Doing so would ensure that a neutral party repre-
sents the public interests involved.134 
Monitorships had already substantially declined by the time these changes to 
DOJ guidance were formally announced. In 2018, there was just one deferred or 
non-prosecution agreement that was accompanied by an independent monitorship 
(the Panasonic deferred prosecution agreement concerning the FCPA).135 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Panasonic Avionics Corp. (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 18-CR- 
00118) (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1058466/download. 
In 2015 
and 2017, there were four such monitorships, and in 2016 there were nine. The av-
erage number of monitors per year from 2005 through 2016 was 6.5. Thus, the 
adoption of this new policy may have reflected a previous approach developed 
more quietly. Figure 3 below displays the number of deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements with corporate monitors from 2001 to 2018 (with the total number of 
agreements in 2015, 101, not displayed).   
Figure 3. Corporate Monitorships, 2001–2018136 
133. See GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 178–79. 
134. See id. at 177. 
135. 
136. Data depicted here is available on the CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, supra note 10. 
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II. THE DECLINE IN INDIVIDUAL PROSECUTIONS 
While Part I described a series of new measures taken by the Trump 
Administration, this Part focuses on a consistent two decades-long pattern: non- 
charging of individuals when corporations settle serious criminal matters. The 
DOJ’s Foundational Principles of Corporate Prosecution now emphasize that 
“[o]ne of the most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by holding ac-
countable all individuals who engage in wrongdoing.”137 Investigations of individ-
ual wrongdoers are now supposed to be the initial focus of any corporate matter, in 
part because doing so helps to “maximize the likelihood that the final resolution 
will include charges against culpable individuals and not just the corporation.”138 
And yet, as this Part describes, the effort to focus more on individual wrongdoing 
has not resulted in any discernable increase in charges in cases in which corpora-
tions settle prosecutions in deferred or non-prosecution agreements. More recently, 
the DOJ has relaxed its policies regarding individual prosecutions in corporate 
cases, which makes it all the more likely that the current pattern will persist. 
A. The Yates Memo 
Prior to 2008, the DOJ had long stated that individual accountability should be 
the focus of corporate prosecution efforts, since for any corporate crime, individual 
officers or employees committed the relevant offenses. However, after the financial 
crisis, critics began to raise the concern that as deferred and non-prosecution agree-
ments became more common, so too did large corporate settlements in which no 
individuals were charged.139 The pattern was as follows: a settlement agreement 
would be announced, the company would pay a large fine and agree to improve 
compliance, and even if individuals were not immunized as part of the settlement, 
in practice, no individuals would be charged in the years afterwards.140 And yet, a 
corporation cannot commit a crime except through its agents. Federal criminal law 
adopts a respondeat superior standard in which a corporation is responsible for 
criminal acts of employees acting in the scope of their duties to the corporation and 
to benefit, at least in part, the corporation.141 If the company admitted a crime 
occurred and accepted responsibility for it, then which individuals were in fact 
responsible? 
In response to these criticisms, the DOJ changed its organizational charging 
guidelines in a number of respects to heighten the focus on individual prosecutions. 
These changes, termed the “Yates Memo” after then-Deputy Attorney General  
137. U.S.A.M. § 9-28.010. 
138. Id. 
139. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 26. 
140. See GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 96. 
141. U.S.A.M. § 9-28.210 (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation may be held criminally 
liable for the illegal acts of its directors, officers, employees, and agents.”). 
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Sally Yates, were adopted in Fall 2015.142 They reflected a concern that corpora-
tions were being prosecuted for crimes while the individual employees and officers 
who committed the crimes were not. In announcing the new policy on September 
10, 2015, Deputy Attorney General Yates summarized: “The rules have just 
changed. Effective today, if a company wants any consideration for its cooperation, 
it must give up the individuals, no matter where they sit within the company.”143 
Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at New York University School of Law 
Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-school. 
The Yates Memo changed the ground rules for corporate prosecutions in a num-
ber of respects. The Memo stated that both civil and criminal investigations would 
prioritize inquiry into the responsibility of individual employees and officers.144 
Additionally, a company must identify all responsible individuals involved in the 
relevant misconduct.145 The Memo also provided that corporations may not receive 
credit for cooperation unless they have provided full information concerning indi-
vidual accountability.146 Further, the Memo makes clear that a settlement with a 
corporation is no substitute for separate charging of responsible individuals, partic-
ularly senior employees or officers.147 No corporate settlement can immunize indi-
viduals from civil or criminal liability.148 These changes provided a roadmap for 
investigating individuals in corporate cases and described a new obligation to pur-
sue individual charges. That said, the change was in part just one of emphasis. The 
prior 2003 Thompson Memo had already emphasized that individual charging 
should be a priority, stating that “[o]nly rarely should provable individual culpabil-
ity not be pursued, even in the face of offers of corporate guilty pleas.”149 
Many predicted that these changes would place enormous pressure on corpora-
tions to waive privilege and that individual employees would face more prosecu-
tions in corporate matters.150 Others were far less sanguine that these changes 
142. U.S.A.M. § 9-28.210. 
143. 
144. U.S.A.M. § 9-28.210 (“It is important early in the corporate investigation to identify the responsible 
individuals and determine the nature and extent of their misconduct. Prosecutors should not allow delays in the 
corporate investigation to undermine the Department’s ability to pursue potentially culpable individuals.”). 
145. Id. § 9-28.700. 
146. Id. (“In order for a company to receive any consideration for cooperation under this section, the company 
must identify all individuals substantially involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of 
their position, status or seniority, and provide to the Department all relevant facts relating to that misconduct.”). 
147. Id. § 9-28.210. 
148. Id. 
149. Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum to Heads of Department 
Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003). 
150. Katrice Bridges Copeland, The Yates Memo: Looking for “Individual Accountability” in All the Wrong 
Places, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1897, 1925 (2017) (“[T]he Yates Memo brings back the culture of waiver[.]”); Mark, 
supra note 15, at 1611 (“[T]he Yates Memorandum is likely to result in continued waivers of the attorney-client 
privilege and attorney work product protection, even if the DOJ does not make express requests.”); see also Scott 
R. Grubman & Samuel M. Shapiro, The “Yates Era” in Full Force: The DOJ Fully Implements Yates Memo, 31 
CRIM. JUST. 17, 19 (2016) (“As a practical matter the Yates Memo and USAM revisions will likely induce many 
companies to waive attorney-client privilege[.]”); Joseph W. Martini & Robert S. Hoff, Individuals Face New 
Challenges Following Yates Memo, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 25, 2016) (“[T]he DOJ’s pronouncement . . . could cause 
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would be meaningful, particularly given incentives to settle cases with corpora-
tions in deferred and non-prosecution agreements.151 In addition, empirically 
measuring whether the Yates Memo was having an effect was difficult because it 
only applied to prospective investigations. Since corporate investigations can take 
some time to pursue and the Yates Memo would tend to delay investigations by fo-
cusing on individuals before settling with a corporation, it had been too early to 
study its potential impact.152 Now that sufficient time has elapsed since the Yates 
Memo’s adoption, we can begin to assess it. 
B. Empirical Analysis of Individual Prosecutions 
An empirical analysis of individual prosecutions accompanying deferred and 
non-prosecution agreements from 2001 to 2012 found that in 89 of 255 corporate 
agreements, some number of individual officers or employees were prosecuted.153 
A more detailed follow-up study examining data through 2014, and also describing 
outcomes in these federal prosecutions, showed that the pattern did not change.154 
Of 306 deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements with organizations, 
34%, or 104 companies, had officers or employees prosecuted, with 414 total indi-
viduals prosecuted.155 Most were not high-ranking individuals. Of the individuals 
prosecuted, thirteen were presidents, twenty-six were CEOs, twenty-eight were 
CFOs, and fifty-nine were vice presidents.156 
In a new analysis of post-Yates memo individual prosecutions, the pattern has 
not noticeably changed. In the four years from 2015 to 2018, fifty-nine individuals 
companies to choose to disclose . . . privileged . . . communication and documents.”). Both in the Memo itself and 
in remarks subsequently, the DOJ made clear that waiver would not be requested. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Second Annual Global Investigations Review Conference 
(Sept. 22, 2015). 
151. Garrett, Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 15; Rena Steinzor, White-Collar 
Reset: The DOJ’s Yates Memo and Its Potential to Protect Health, Safety, and the Environment, 7 WAKE FOREST 
J.L. & POL’Y. 39, 56 (2017) (“Unfortunately, the Yates Memo makes no attempt to deal with DPAs and the 
damaging perception that their primary usefulness is as a vehicle for implementing decisions that an institution is 
too big to jail. If the DOJ continues to use them in cases where public scrutiny is intense, it could sacrifice the 
palliative effects it seeks by re-emphasizing individual prosecutions.”); Mark, supra note 15, at 1631 (“The 
failure of the Yates Memorandum to address either DPAs or NPAs, in combination with the revised USAM’s 
continued endorsement of both devices, threatens to undermine the efficacy of the DOJ’s new approach to 
holding individuals accountable.”). 
152. See Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 14, at 1853; see also Mark, supra note 15, at 
1670 (“Given the long time lag inherent in most white collar investigations, it is too soon to tell whether the 
Memorandum is accomplishing its paramount goal of holding executives and other individuals accountable for 
corporate misconduct.”). 
153. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 83 (“In about two-thirds of the cases no individual officers 
or employees were prosecuted for related crimes, while in about one-third of deferred prosecution or non- 
prosecution agreements (35%, or 89 of 255) there were prosecutions of such individuals. This trend has not 
changed over time; as deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements gained popularity, the proportion of 
cases with individuals prosecuted has remained fairly stable[.]”). 
154. Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 14, at 1853. 
155. Id. at 1791. 
156. Id. 
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were charged accompanying deferred prosecution agreements, as Figure 4 
displays. 
Figure 4. Individual Prosecutions Accompanying Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements, 2001–2018 
During the entire period from 2001 through 2018, there were individual prosecu-
tions in 134 of 497 deferred and non-prosecution agreements, with 447 total indi-
viduals prosecuted. Of those, thirty-four were CEOs (typically former CEOs), 
thirty were CFOs, and seventeen were presidents. Thus, since the end of 2014, 
there have been thirty additional corporate deferred and non-prosecution agree-
ments in which individuals were prosecuted alongside the firm. For the entire time 
period from 2001 to 2018, individuals faced prosecution in 37%, or 134, of the 497 
total agreements with organizations. Figure 4 below displays these data by depict-
ing both total agreements and the number of agreements in which individuals were 
charged for each year. 
The decline in individual charging is more apparent when one focuses on 2015– 
2018 and not just the lower average over the entire time period. While it might 
seem notable that there have been 178 deferred and non-prosecution agreements 
during that time, the main reason is the large number of non-prosecution agree-
ments entered in 2015 with Swiss banks as part of a program to offer lenient settle-
ments rewarding self-reporting and cooperation.157 
The Department of Justice made available materials from each Swiss Bank Program case available 
online. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SWISS BANK PROGRAM, http://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program. 
None of those cases involved 
individual charges filed, including for practical and jurisdictional reasons, as the 
banks tended to be small or mid-sized Swiss banks (albeit ones providing tax shel-
ters to U.S. taxpayers).158 
157. 
158. See Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, supra note 6, at 37–38, Appendix A. 
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Focusing just on 2017–2018, however, shows that any decline is less stark. 
There were forty-seven deferred or non-prosecution agreements in 2017–2018, fif-
teen of which were cases in which individuals were charged, or 32%.159 That rate 
would be smaller (28%), though, if it accounted for the eight declinations in which 
no individuals were charged (in 2019, however, Cognizant received a declination 
in which individuals were charged).160 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Declination Letter, Cognizant Tech. Solutions Corp., Feb. 13, 2019, https://www. 
justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1132666/download. 
The result is that no meaningful change can 
be observed in the time period before or after the Yates Memo was adopted. If any-
thing, individual charging has declined in the years since it was adopted. 
In addition to examining individual prosecutions accompanying deferred and 
non-prosecution agreements, the study also examined plea agreements entered 
with public companies. After all, it is conceivable that individual prosecutions 
became more common post-Yates Memo in cases involving convictions of corpo-
rations. From 2001 to 2012, 25% of public companies prosecuted had individual 
employees charged.161 Including cases from 2001 through 2018, 48 of 169 public 
companies had individuals charged, a negligible difference, or 28% of companies 
prosecuted. 
These data confirm the views of observers who predicted early on that prosecu-
tors would over time “retreat” from any strict or “all-or-nothing” approach towards 
the Yates Memo.162 
See Chris Bruce, U.S. Will Retreat on Yates Memo, Former Justice Official Predicts, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 
23, 2015), http://www.bna.com/us-retreat-yates-n57982063844/. 
Similarly, some observers, this author included, have argued 
that in context, the Yates Memo changes were not as dramatic as they appeared 
and that they were largely aspirational.163 They could not or would not be strictly 
enforced due to the practical challenges in pursuing individual charges before set-
tling a case with a corporation.164 Indeed, in announcing a change to the policy in 
Fall 2018, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein noted that the Yates Memo had 
not been strictly enforced: “we learned that the policy was not strictly enforced in 
some cases because it would have impeded resolutions and wasted resources.”165 
These data bear out those observations. The Yates Memo also may have never 
been fully implemented under the strict language of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual, 
the guidebook for all federal prosecutions. DOJ policies are merely guidelines. 
They are not binding on prosecutors and seek only to inform decision-making. The 
experience with the Yates Memo suggests that such guidance and policies may not 
159. See CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, supra note 10. 
160. 
161. See GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 84 (“A similar pattern held true for public companies 
that were convicted. Slightly fewer (25[%], or 31 of 125) convicted public companies or their subsidiaries had 
officers or employees prosecuted.”). 
162. 
163. See Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, supra note 15. 
164. See id. at 65–67 (“DOJ policy had already emphasized for some time that ‘[o]nly rarely should provable 
individual culpability not be pursued[.]’”); Joh & Joo, supra note 15, at 58–59. 
165. Rod Rosenstein, Remarks at the American Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 18. 
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be fully implemented if there are practical and resource-based obstacles to doing 
so. 
C. Relaxing the Yates Memo 
In Fall 2018, then-Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced that the 
prior Yates Memo approach would not be ended, but would be amended and 
relaxed.166 The new DOJ approach would focus on speedier resolutions and only 
the most important individuals worth charging. As Deputy Attorney General 
Rosenstein put it: “investigations should not be delayed merely to collect informa-
tion about individuals whose involvement was not substantial, and who are not 
likely to be prosecuted.”167 These changes were incorporated into the U.S. 
Attorney’s Manual, as the Yates Memo and prior revisions to these organizational 
prosecution principles had been.168 
On its face, the change might be viewed as simply one of emphasis. It is far more 
expeditious to settle a case with a company and not wait to investigate all individuals. 
Moreover, the focus should always be and likely always was on the individuals who 
had the most substantial involvement in federal crimes. Indeed, as mentioned above, 
in announcing the Yates Memo, then-Deputy Attorney General Yates emphasized 
that individual charging should not focus simply on lower-level employees who were 
simply following the directives of their supervisors. However, to give a corporation 
full credit for cooperation when investigations into individuals are still pending raises 
questions about how effective that cooperation will be. That the Yates Memo was not 
strictly enforced helps to explain why no observable change in individual prosecu-
tions accompanying deferred and non-prosecution agreements occurred. Moreover, 
that a softened version of the Memo is now DOJ policy suggests there will not be any 
change in this ingrained pattern in the near future. 
The new policy towards formal corporate declinations may also affect the num-
bers of individual prosecutions in a less visible way. If a company is offered a dec-
lination, despite the stated policy, the result may signal that criminal charges are 
not warranted. Perhaps such an appearance of no wrongdoing makes it difficult to 
bring criminal charges against employees or officers. And yet, under the new pol-
icy, declinations may still be offered when crimes did in fact occur—though the 
declination rewards corporate cooperation, not non-criminality. Some observers 
predicted that because of the focus on substantial cooperation, the new declination 
policy would buttress efforts to target individual wrongdoers.169 Yet just one of the 
declinations offered during the Trump Administration so far has been accompanied 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. U.S.A.M. § 9-28.210. 
169. David W. Brown et al., DOJ Issues New FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy, PAUL WEISS (Nov. 30, 
2017), at 1 (describing policy as part of the DOJ’s “redoubled effort to bring criminal prosecutions against 
individual offenders”). 
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by any individual charges, as noted. While that may reflect the practical challenges 
in the FCPA context in which they were negotiated, the lack of individual charging 
also undermines one of the rationales for offering declinations. 
Thus, the Yates memo approach seems not to have fully taken hold and has 
never produced its intended results. The explanation for this may be practical in 
that it takes substantial resources to pursue individual investigations in complex 
corporate settings. Perhaps expecting individual accountability for corporate 
crimes unless the resources are made available to meaningfully enforce them is 
unrealistic. To do so expeditiously while settling cases with the corporation before 
statutes of limitations expire would require far more dedicated corporate prosecu-
tion resources. The next Part turns to that urgent need. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
The tenth anniversary of the 2007–2008 financial crisis sparked reflection 
concerning what went wrong, whether the responses to that crisis have been adequate, 
and how the crisis continues to shape politics and policy to this day. Unsurprisingly, 
some of that analysis turned to the prosecutory response to the crisis. Phil Angelides, 
the chair of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, said: “I believe it was a seminal 
failure of the Obama administration not to hold accountable the people responsible 
for the wrongdoing.”170 
Lydia DePillis, 10 Years After the Financial Crisis, Have We Learned Anything?, CNN (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/13/news/economy/financial-crisis-10-years-later-lehman/index.html. 
If not investing in enhanced corporate accountability immedi-
ately after the crisis was a mistake, ten years later, matters have not improved. What 
changes were made to enhance criminal accountability have been largely rolled back. 
They have done so in an overlapping and cumulative fashion, as Part I describes, and 
many changes did not have the intended effect, as Part II describes. 
Section A of this Part summarizes each of the policy changes described so far in 
this Article. Section B describes how these changes have occurred in a setting in 
which there are important vacancies across the DOJ and other enforcement agencies, 
and in which there is unusual disarray across federal agencies. Competent enforce-
ment cannot easily occur, particularly in complex cases, in such an environment. 
Section C asks what lessons this weakening of the corporate prosecution function can 
teach. To better safeguard accountability, independent actors, like judges, independ-
ent administrative actors, or private litigants must be involved in the enforcement pro-
cess. Section D explores whether legislative solutions are available. 
A. A Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policy Rollback 
The empirical trend in corporate penalties reflects a set of meaningful changes 
in DOJ policy. One after another, the DOJ has rolled out changes designed to 
soften its approach to corporations. Six changes to written DOJ policy have been 
described in Parts I and II: 
170. 
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First, the DOJ has expressed its new practice to not engage in “piling on” fi-
nancial penalties, in which a company might pay penalties to multiple 
enforcers. The general suggestion was that fines had been excessive in the 
past and that they should be reduced. 
Second, the DOJ has expanded what was initially a pilot policy in the FCPA 
context to decline all criminal charges against fully cooperating corporations 
accused of foreign bribery violations. Under this new policy, if prosecutors 
deem a company to have sufficiently cooperated and reported their crimes, no 
charges are filed. 
Third, in March 2018, the DOJ began to extend this declination approach to 
all corporate prosecutions. 
Fourth, the Yates Memo was relaxed in Fall 2017, including to permit settle-
ments with corporations when individual investigations are pending, to focus 
on the more serious individuals and relax discretion in companion civil cases. 
Fifth, the DOJ declined to renew the position of compliance counsel, a person 
with expertise who could evaluate whether a company had good compliance 
and was making good efforts to repair problems. 
Sixth, the DOJ provided new guidelines on corporate compliance and moni-
tors. The new monitorship guidelines include some helpful ground rules and 
procedures, but suggest that often a monitor “will not be necessary” unless 
based on some “demonstrated need.” 
As discussed, these changes should be understood as part of an overall approach 
towards corporate enforcement. Many, taken individually, are modest alterations 
on their face. Some are quite reasonable and may reflect prior practice, such as 
extending the FCPA pilot program or the statement that fines should not “pile on” 
penalties imposed by other agencies. Together, they represent an approach 
designed to bring more leniency to corporate prosecutions. 
B. DOJ Transition and Vacancies 
It was striking how at the outset of his tenure in April 2017, then-Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions emphasized that corporate misconduct would remain a cen-
tral priority, despite the changed focus on bringing more severe prosecutions 
for immigration, drug, and violent offenses.171 
Matt Zapotosky, Sessions: Focus on Violent Crime Doesn’t Mean Lax Enforcement for White-Collar Offenses, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-focus-on-violent- 
crime-doesnt-mean-lax-enforcement-for-white-collar-offenses/2017/04/24/d36d4034-2906-11e7-be51-b3fc6ff7faee_ 
story.html. Sessions, speaking to an audience of compliance officers, emphasized that the new Administration 
would “still enforce the laws that protect American consumers and ensure that honest businesses are not placed 
at a disadvantage to dishonest businesses.” Id. 
That did not come to pass. As 
described, a series of measures were adopted to relax the DOJ’s approach towards 
171. 
136                              AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW                              [Vol. 57:109 
corporate prosecutions. Those changes accompanied a severity-oriented approach 
towards non-corporate prosecutions in individual cases. In May 2017, then- 
Attorney General Sessions announced a DOJ charging and sentencing policy ask-
ing all federal prosecutors to bring the most serious “readily provable” charges and 
disclose all facts that would support mandatory minimum or other sentences for all 
federal crimes.172 
Jeffrey Sessions, U.S. Att’y General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum for All Federal Prosecutors, 
Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/ 
965896/download (“[I]t is a core principle that prosecutors should charge and pursue the most serious, readily 
provable offense.”). In doing so, this policy rescinded 2013 and 2014 policies. Id. at 2 n.1. Previous policies 
included: Department Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in 
Certain Drug Cases (August 12, 2013); and Guidance Regarding § 851 Enhancements in Plea Negotiations 
(September 24, 2014). Id. 
That brief policy for federal charging and sentencing makes for a 
striking contrast to the complex set of guidelines for negotiating corporate 
charging. 
Indeed, the contrast between leniency for corporations and severity for individu-
als (but perhaps not in corporate cases) was particularly telling when the New 
York Times reported on the Duke and UVA Criminal Prosecution Registry data in 
October 2018.173 
Ben Protess, Robert Gebeloff & Danielle Ivory, Trump Administration Spares Corporate Wrongdoers 
Billions in Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/trump-sec-doj- 
corporate-penalties.html. 
DOJ’s spokesperson responded, “Attorney General Sessions has 
set clear goals for this department: reducing violent crime, homicides, opioid pre-
scriptions and drug overdose deaths.”174 The spokesperson added: “Under his lead-
ership, we have begun to achieve all four of these goals by increasing violent crime 
and firearm prosecutions to all-time highs.”175 Drug, immigration, and firearm 
prosecutions may have reached all-time highs, in terms of numbers of offenders. In 
Fall 2018, the DOJ touted a 38% increase in immigration illegal re-entry charges 
filed, a 86% increase in illegal entry charges, and a 15% increase in violent felony 
charges filed.176 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Smashes Records for Violent Crime, Gun Crime, 
Illegal Immigration Prosecutions, Increases Drug and White collar Prosecutions (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-smashes-records-violent-crime-gun-crime-illegal-immigration-prosecutions. 
The DOJ touted a 3% increase from the prior year in white collar filings, but other data suggests that there has 
been a decline in prosecution of white collar offenses. Id. Such offenses are not readily defined and they do not 
neatly overlap with corporate prosecutions, in which an entity is charged, which are the focus here. 
Those small offender cases, though, may have crowded out efforts 
to tackle serious corporate offenders in complex individual and corporate cases. 
The change in DOJ’s focus may explain the data observed here and the change in 
tone from April 2017 to October 2018. 
Another feature of the Trump Administration’s approach at the DOJ is that posi-
tions were extremely slow to fill, with key positions vacant two years into the first 
term. For example, the DOJ decided to postpone its search for the third-in- 
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when several candidates declined to be considered.177 
Sadie Gurman & Aruna Viswanatha, Trump Administration Puts on Hold Search for Justice Department 
No. 3, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-sidelines-effort-to- 
appoint-justice-department-no-3-1528208396. 
Chiefs of several divisions, 
including the Criminal Division, remain unfilled as of early 2019. As of mid-2019, 
there were still two acting chiefs of the Fraud Section at Main Justice, with the 
Deputy Senior Chief position vacant.178 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Section, About the Fraud Section, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud. 
The Chief of the Fraud Section was hired 
in July 2019.179 
Kadhim Shubber, US Justice Department Appoints Robert Zink As Fraud Section Chief, FIN. TIMES (July 
30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/76ccaa5e-b2cf-11e9-bec9-fdcab53d6959. 
In early 2018, affiliated agencies, including the Drug Enforcement 
Agency and the U.S. Marshals Service also had unfilled leadership positions.180 
Carrie Johnson, Key Vacancies at Justice Department ‘Not A Recipe For Good Government’, NPR 




Former Inspector General Michael Bromwich commented: “I’m not aware of any 
precedent for so many key positions in DOJ and its affiliated agencies remaining 
vacant for so long at the beginning of an administration.”181 Observers have noted 
that these vacancies may impact corporate enforcement.182 
John F. Savarese, et al., White Collar and Regulatory Enforcement: What to Expect in 2018, NYU 
COMPLIANCE & ENF’T BLOG (Jan. 29, 2018), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2018/01/29/white- 
collar-and-regulatory-enforcement-what-to-expect-in-2018/. 
These problems with 
staffing are not unique to the DOJ or affiliated agencies either, but rather are 
common to the White House and other federal agencies under the Trump 
Administration.183 
Abigail Tracy, There’s a Good Reason Nobody Wants to Work for Jeff Sessions, VANITY FAIR (June 6, 
2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/06/donald-trump-jeff-sessions-justice-department-vacancies. 
Vacancies are not all that has harmed the ability of federal prosecutors to bring 
complex cases. At the DOJ itself, President Trump repeatedly attacked the 
Department, then-Attorney General Sessions, and line prosecutors regarding the 
investigation of independent counsel Robert Mueller.184 Anyone willing to fill top 
positions would become subject to questions regarding their role in that ongoing 
investigation.185 The vacancies, surrounding uncertainty, and potential for conflict 
may impact the ability to negotiate complex matters with the assurance that a per-
manent head of a division could have during a less tumultuous administration. 
That said, as discussed above, the DOJ has made a series of consistent changes 
to organizational prosecution policies. These changes have all pushed in the direc-
tion of bringing fewer charges against corporations and reducing the penalties 
when charges are brought. As in the past, the process for considering such changes 
and evaluating them has not been public as a formal regulatory process would be. 
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settlements suggests that the change in approach goes far beyond just the change in 
monetary penalties imposed upon corporations. 
C. Implications for Corporate Accountability 
Naively assuming that corporate prosecutions would continue to become more 
rigorous may be understandable. That was the trend-line in the years following the 
recent financial crisis. The Obama administration gradually responded to “too big 
to jail” concerns in a number of meaningful ways. Deputy Attorney General Sally 
Yates announced new policies designed to focus on targeting individual corporate 
officers and employees. New policies tightened standards for corporate compliance 
and cooperation. Banks pleaded guilty in major cases rather than receiving out-of- 
court deals. Criticizing the prior approach towards corporate crime, presidential 
nominee Hillary Clinton called for expanding resources for white-collar prosecu-
tions and shifting enforcement priorities.186 
See Hillary for Am., Factsheet, Hillary Clinton: Wall Street Should Work for Main Street, http://www. 
hillaryclinton.com/p/briefing/factsheets/2015/10/08/wall-street-work-for-main-street. 
The policy platform on that topic and 
associated speech did not attract much attention during the 2016 presidential cam-
paign, however. Candidate Trump launched attacks on Wall Street banks, includ-
ing using an anti-Semitic closing advertisement describing the “trillions of dollars 
at stake,” and showing images of financier George Soros and Goldman Sachs CEO 
Lloyd Blankfein.187 
Jonathan D. Salant, Trump criticized for anti-Semitic memes in closing ad, NJ.COM (Nov. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nj.com/politics/2016/11/trump_criticized_for_anti-semitic_memes_in_closing.html. 
Then again, candidate Trump promised to give corporations 
breaks on taxes and regulations,188 
Chris Matthews, Donald Trump Says He Can Slash Corporate Taxes, FORTUNE (Aug. 8, 2016), https:// 
fortune.com/2016/08/08/donald-trump-corporate-tax/. 
which the Trump Administration has in part 
accomplished.189 
For an overview and reports on implementation of Dodd-Frank, see U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (SEC), 
Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Accountability Act, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd- 
frank.shtml. 
Largely missing is any expressed concern for the public interest in enforcement 
to prevent and punish corporate crime. Instead, the overall focus has been to con-
sult with industry, reduce the cost of resolving major criminal cases for corpora-
tions, and ease the burdens on prosecutors to speedily resolve cases. The changes 
may be expedient both for prosecutors and corporations, but they neglect the public 
interest. 
D. Legislating Corporate Criminal Liability 
Congress has occasionally considered, but in recent years rarely adopted, legis-
lation concerning corporate crime. In the past, the author has advocated for legisla-
tion that would require judicial review of deferred prosecution agreements, 
including through revisions to the Speedy Trial Act, revisions to the organizational 
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corporate settlements.190 Legislation regarding transparency in corporate settle-
ments passed in the U.S. Senate in 2015, but was largely not enacted.191 The only 
measure enacted was to enhance crime victim’s rights when deferred prosecution 
agreements are entered with corporations.192 In general, Parts I and II discuss the 
enforcement discretion of prosecutors. Administrative agencies have broad discre-
tion whether and how to seek to enforce regulations and statutes.193 A decision not 
to enforce is not reviewable under the doctrine of Heckler v. Chaney,194 and neither 
are agency guidelines, priorities for enforcement,195 nor decisions regarding how 
to allocate enforcement funds.196 
For those reasons, a better legislative focus would be to create a standing 
capacity to investigate and enforce corporate offenses. Efforts to detect white- 
collar crime, like the SEC Office of the Whistleblower,197 
SEC, Office of the Whistleblower, Claim an Award, http://www.sec.gov/about /offices/owb/owb-awards. 
shtml. 
could be expanded. 
More far-reaching, Senator Elizabeth Warren has proposed the “Accountable 
Capitalism Act” to federally charter corporations and change corporate governance 
more fundamentally, requiring 40% of corporate boards to be elected by employ-
ees, sharp limits on political spending, and broader public-interest considering- 
Benefit Corporation obligations of the board.198 
See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. §§ 4(a), 6(b)(1), 8 (2018), https://www.warren. 
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Accountable%20Capitalism%20Act.pdf. 
Relevant to corporate crime, the 
Act would permit charter revocation for a company that engaged in repeat or egre-
gious illegal acts.199 
More continuity with a separate or even independent corporate prosecution 
function and the resources to bring both complex individual and corporate matters 
is possible. A Corporate Prosecution Division could be created at Main Justice 
with branch offices in key districts for corporate prosecutions, such as Southern 
District of New York, the Eastern District of Virginia, and the Northern District of 
California. The Antitrust Division has a long tradition of independent policy and 
consistency in practice, and it similarly has field offices.200 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division, Sections and Offices, https://www.justice.gov/atr/sections-and- 
offices. 
Other types of corporate 
prosecutions that have been most consistent in recent years, such as FCPA prose-
cutions, in which the Criminal Fraud Division received enhanced resources and  
190. For a discussion of possible legislation regarding each of these topics, see Garrett, The Corporate 
Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 14, at 1839–46. 
191. See Truth in Settlements Act of 2015, S. 1109, 114th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Sept. 21, 2015). 
192. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9). 
193. See Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (2016). 
194. 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985). 
195. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64, 67 (2004). 
196. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993). 
197. 
198. 
199. Id. §§ 8(c)(2), 9. 
200. 
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new positions, have been more insulated from swings in policy.201 Given the finan-
cial penalties involved, the U.S. Treasury would benefit from enhancing this func-
tion. Senator Warren introduced Ending Too Big to Jail Act of 2019, which would 
create a permanent investigative unit along the lines discussed. The bill would pro-
ceed by reconstituting the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (SIGTARP) as the Special Inspector General for Financial Institution 
Crime (SIGFIC), expanding its jurisdiction, and making this entity permanent.202 
See Ending Too Big to Jail Act, S. 1005, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 
116/s1005. 
To be sure, if the political and policy choice was made at the presidential or 
Attorney General level, none of those changes would prevent enforcement from 
declining. Indeed, the tradition of independence and discretion at individual U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices can also protect against policy swings at Main Justice.203 The 
Antitrust Division model, with a central office and also branch offices, might best 
fit the traditions and the model of federal prosecution as a joint national and local 
enterprise. 
Other countries have created a separate corporate crime enforcement agency. 
For example, after enacting new corporate crime legislation, Ireland created a 
Corporate Enforcement Authority, which investigates potential corporate crimes 
and initiates summary proceedings or refers cases to prosecuting authorities.204 
General Scheme of the Companies (Corporate Enforcement Authority) Bill of 2018 (Ir.), https://dbei. 
gov.ie/en/Legislation/General-Scheme-Companies-Corporate-Enforcement-Authority-Bill-2018.html. 
In 
Fall 2016, France enacted the Sapin II legislation, which created a new French 
anti-bribery agency to issue regulations for anti-bribery compliance accompanying 
adoption of specific provisions regarding judicial review and approval of deferred 
prosecution agreements in criminal cases.205 
Loi 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la 
modernisation de la vie économique (1), JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, Dec. 10, 2016 
(“Sapin II”); see also Frederick T. Davis, A French Court Authorizes the First-Ever “French DPA”, NYU 
COMPLIANCE & ENF’T BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/11/24/a-french- 
court-authorizes-the-first-ever-french-dpa. 
Thus, France rejected the proposal to 
adopt a U.S.-style model in which deferred prosecution agreements with corpora-
tions could be entered largely out of court. Instead, Sapin II calls for ongoing regu-
lation by an administrative agency overseeing anti-corruption efforts. Canada 
adopted a deferred prosecution approach through legislation, which requires that 
remediation agreements satisfy the public interest and be approved by the judge.206 
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C–46, § 715.37(1) (“When the prosecutor and the organization have 
agreed to the terms of a remediation agreement, the prosecutor must apply to the court in writing for an order 
approving the agreement.”), https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/page-182.html#docCont. 
The new regime has already resulted in controversy concerning SNC Lavalin’s in-
terest in promoting enactment of the legislation to obtain a more lenient settlement; 
201. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT 
PLAN AND GUIDANCE, supra note 19. 
202. 
203. See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement 
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prosecutors ultimately did not offer a DPA, and the company now faces a criminal 
trial.207 
SNC-Lavalin posts $2.1 billion loss as assets revalued, DAILY COM. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2019), https:// 
canada.constructconnect.com/dcn/news/economic/2019/08/snc-lavalin-posts-2-1-billion-loss-assets-revalued. 
Other countries, such as Australia and Singapore, are considering new cor-
porate crime legislation adopting judicially-reviewed settlement approaches.208 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017 (Cth) (Austl.), https://www.aph. 
gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/ Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s1108; Singapore Criminal 
Justice Reform Bill, Bill No. 14/2018, § 149(F), https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Bills-Supp/14-2018. 
Some countries that have created such entities may have done so in part because 
they lack experienced and well-resourced corporate prosecution groups like those 
the DOJ already has. However, some type of independent agency might ensure 
more consistent investigations and policymaking over time. Such an agency might 
be a focus for resources as well. Conversely, it could also be an attractive target for 
cuts, like enforcement at the IRS and SEC has been over the years. That agency 
could then coordinate with a Corporate Prosecution Division at the Department of 
Justice, but it could ensure continuity in policy, regulations, and investigations of 
corporate conduct. Today, that function is handled ad hoc by a task force (which 
the DOJ rebadged, having disbanded the Financial Crimes Task Force in 2018).209 
The new task force is the Task Force on Market Integrity and Consumer Fraud. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Department of Justice, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Federal Trade Commission Announce Task Force on Market Integrity and Consumer Fraud (July 11, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-bureau-consumer-financial-protection-us-securities-and- 
exchange-commission. 
Other countries have adopted approaches that rely more heavily on statutory 
guidelines and judicial review. In 2013, the United Kingdom enacted the Crime 
and Courts Act of 2013, permitting deferred prosecution agreements with corpora-
tions.210 
See U.K. Serious Fraud Off., Deferred Prosecution Agreements, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/ 
guidance-policy-and-protocols/deferred-prosecution-agreements/. 
However, the legislation requires judicial oversight and approval. The 
Crown Prosecution Service and Serious Fraud Office produced additional detailed 
guidance accompanying the legislation.211 
U.K. CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE & SERIOUS FRAUD OFF., DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 
CODE OF PRACTICE (2014), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/?wpdmdl=1447. 
Once such an agreement is negotiated, 
it is presented to the Crown Court for approval, and the judge reviews it asking 
whether the agreement is “fair, reasonable, and proportionate.”212 Only four 
deferred prosecution agreements have been entered in the U.K. to date.213 
Our corporate criminal system continues to rely on the discretion of line prosecu-
tors, who decide how they wish to settle the largest criminal cases based on lengthy, 
complex, non-binding, and constantly-amended organizational prosecution princi-
ples. Judicial review is almost entirely absent from deferred prosecution agree-
ments, which are stayed on federal district court dockets, and is entirely absent from 






212. Id. at 17. 
213. F. Joseph Warin et al., supra note 39. 
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in court.214 In 2009, the Government Accountability Office criticized the DOJ 
for lack of criteria for deciding whether a company receives a deferred or non- 
prosecution agreements, but little has changed.215 In 2015, federal district judge 
Richard J. Leon rejected a deferred prosecution agreement with a company for for-
eign bribery, noting that not only were “no individuals . . . being prosecuted for 
their conduct at issue here” but also “a number of the employees who were directly 
involved in the transactions are being allowed to remain with the company.”216 
However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned that ruling and held that 
the district judge abused discretion in rejecting a corporate deferred prosecution 
agreement.217 No sound and rational regulator would choose such a system, de-
pendent on prosecutorial discretion with only non-binding guidance, to prevent se-
rious corporate misconduct. More than ten years after the crisis, it is time to 
formalize corporate enforcement rather than depend on informal task forces and 
ever-shifting and non-binding guidelines in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual. 
CONCLUSION 
Ten years after the crisis, there is little public pressure to respond to the family 
of “too big to jail” problems associated with the decline in corporate prosecutions 
and the weakening of corporate enforcement policy. Federal corporate penalties 
sharply declined with the change in presidential administrations. Despite stated 
efforts to charge individuals alongside corporations, such individual prosecutions 
have remained infrequent and fairly marginal. The DOJ has introduced a series of 
policies to reduce corporate criminal penalties, relax individual charging priorities, 
avoid the use of independent corporate monitors, and more. The change in federal 
corporate prosecutions priorities has been sharp, and it is apparent in outcomes. In 
practice, the DOJ has in a variety of ways extended new forms and degree of leni-
ency to the largest companies in the most serious criminal cases. 
Across the globe, countries have increased their focus on corporate prosecutions 
in recent years. Several have enacted new corporate crime statutes and created new 
administrative agencies that focus on corporate criminal enforcement. The U.S. 
could learn from such approaches, which aim to rely less on prosecutorial discre-
tion and more on judicial and administrative review. Centering corporate prosecu-
tion functions in a dedicated expert group within the DOJ would help insulate this 
work, in the way that the Antitrust Division and the FCPA group has been insu-
lated. The inconstancy of U.S. corporate prosecution policy and practice is a func-
tion of our system’s reliance first and foremost on nearly unfettered prosecutorial 
discretion. A growing body of non-binding guidelines accompanies a complex 
214. See Garrett, Public Interest in Corporate Settlements, supra note 124. 
215. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-636T, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE DOJ’S USE 
AND OVERSIGHT OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (2009). 
216. U.S. v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 166 (D.D.C. 2015). 
217. U.S. v. Fokker Servs., B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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system for corporate prosecutions that ultimately hinges on the policies and atti-
tudes of prosecutors. The U.S. system of negotiated outcomes does not deliver cer-
tainty for corporations and does not serve the public interest well. Prosecutors 
were widely seen as not having responded adequately to the financial crisis. 
However, the U.S. continues to rely on the discretion of varied groups of prosecu-
tors, with their political and resource constraints, to handle the most serious corpo-
rate crimes. Ten years later, if we still have not learned the lessons of the last 
financial crisis, the next one cannot be far ahead. 
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APPENDIX A. CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS IN THE LAST 20 MONTHS OF THE OBAMA 













plea Fraud - 
General 
2017-04-21   2,800,000,000 No Yes 
Takata Corp. plea Fraud - 
General 
2017-03-07   1,000,000,000 No No 
Citicorp plea Antitrust 2017-01-10   925,000,000 Yes Yes 
General 
Motors 
DP Fraud - 
General 
2015-09-17   900,000,000 No Yes 
Barclays PLC plea Fraud - 
General 





DP Kickbacks 2016-02-29   612,000,000   No 
The Western 
Union Co. 
DP Bank Secrecy 
Act 
2017-01-19   586,000,000 Yes Yes 
JP Morgan 
Chase & Co 
plea Antitrust 2017-01-10   550,000,000 Yes Yes 
Bank Julius 
Baer & Co. 
Ltd. 
DP Fraud - Tax 2016-02-04   542,000,000 Yes No 
Braskem S.A. plea Fraud - 
General 
2017-01-26   537,731,535 No Yes 
Tenet 
Healthcare 
NP Fraud - 
General 





DP FCPA 2016-12-22   497,773,518 No Yes 
2020]                                  DECLINING CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS                                 145 














plea Fraud - 
General 
2017-01-10   395,000,000 Yes Yes 
VimpelCom 
Ltd. 





DP FCPA 2016-09-28   213,055,689 No Yes 
UBS plea Fraud - 
General 





NP Fraud - Tax 2016-01-01   187,767,000 Yes No 
Rolls-Royce 
plc 






DP Import / 
Export 








DP Fraud - 
General 
2016-12-13   112,822,616 No No 
Embraer S.A. DP FCPA 2016-10-24   107,285,090 No No 
Bank 
Lombard 
Odier & Co. 
Ltd. 
NP Fraud - Tax 2015-12-01   99,809,000 Yes No 
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NP Fraud - Tax 2015-12-08   99,211,000 Yes No 
Odebrecht  
S.A. 
plea Fraud - 
General 
2017-04-17   96,000,000 No Yes 
Bank J. Safra 
Sarasin SA 




plea Fraud - 
General 
2016-10-21   84,696,727 No No 
Coutts & Co. 
Ltd. 





NP FCPA 2016-11-17   72,000,000 Yes Yes 
General 
Cable Corp. 

















plea Antitrust 2015-11-02   62,000,000   No 
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plea Fraud - 
General 
2016-10-21   61,091,618 No No 
BNP-Paribas 
(Suisse) SA 




NP Fraud - Tax 2015-12-30   49,757,000 Yes No 
Las Vegas 
Sands Corp. 















NP Fraud - Tax 2015-12-21   41,677,000 Yes No 
Genzyme 
Corp. 
DP FDCA / 
Pharma 
2015-08-31   32,587,439 No No 
Deutsche Bank 
(Suisse) SA 










NP Fraud - Tax 2015-11-20   29,988,000 Yes No 
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NP FCPA 2016-02-16   28,162,000 No No 
The Tulving 
Co., Inc. 
plea Fraud - 
General 




NP Import / 
Export 
2016-11-01   25,000,000 No No 
Dreyfus Sons 
& Co. Ltd. 
Banquiers 








DP FCPA 2016-03-01   22,800,000   No 
Cantor 
Gaming / CG 
Technology 
NP Bank Secrecy 
Act 








plea Fraud - 
Health Care 




DP Fraud - 
General 
2015-12-10   20,230,918 No No 
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DP FDCA / 
Pharma 









NP Fraud - Tax 2015-10-02   15,365,000 Yes No 
Rubycon 
Corp. 
plea Antitrust 2017-03-03   12,000,000 No No 
Rothschild 
Bank AG 
NP Fraud - Tax 2015-06-03   11,510,000 Yes No 




NP Fraud - Tax 2015-10-27   11,031,000 Yes No 
Discovery 
Sales, Inc. 
plea Fraud - 
General 
2016-12-26   11,000,000 No No 
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NP Fraud - Tax 2015-10-09   10,390,000 Yes No 
Schroder & 
Co. Bank AG 









NP Fraud - Tax 2015-08-31   9,481,000 Yes No 
Habib Bank 
AG Zurich 
NP Fraud - Tax 2015-10-15   9,400,000 Yes No 
Bank La 
Roche & Co. 
AG 
NP Fraud - Tax 2015-09-03   9,296,000 Yes No 
Alpha Corp. plea Antitrust 2016-12-14   9,000,000 No No 
Biocompatib-
les Inc. 
plea FDCA / 
Pharma 




DP Fraud - 
General 
2016-10-14   7,845,539 No No 
Bordier & 
CIE 
NP Fraud - Tax 2015-12-04   7,827,000 Yes No 
B. Braun 
Medical, Inc. 
NP FDCA / 
Pharma 




plea Import / 
Export 




NP Fraud - Tax 2015-12-03   7,700,000 Yes No 
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2016-05-27   7,000,000 No No 
Wood Group 
P S N Inc 
plea False 
Statements 














NP Fraud - Tax 2015-12-08   5,570,000 Yes No 
Corner Banca 
SA 




plea Antitrust 2016-06-21   5,000,000 No No   
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DP FCPA 2018-06-05   860,552,888 No No 
Telia 
Company AB 
DP FCPA 2017-09-21   548,603,972 No No 
U.S. Bancorp DP Bank Secrecy 
Act 
2018-02-12   453,000,000 Yes Yes 
ZTE Corp. plea Import / 
Export 





plea FDCA / 
Pharma 




DP FCPA 2018-04-30   137,400,000 No Yes 
HSBC 
Holdings Plc 
DP Fraud - 
General 




DP FCPA 2017-12-22   105,554,245 No No 
Zurcher 
Kantonalbank 
DP Fraud - Tax 2018-08-07   98,533,560 Yes No 
Banamex 
USA 
NP Bank Secrecy 
Act 
2017-05-18   90,000,000 Yes Yes 
BNP Paribas 
USA, Inc. 




NP FCPA 2018-09-26   85,320,000 No No 
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plea Immigration 2017-09-28   80,000,000 No No 
Legg Mason 
Inc. 
NP FCPA 2018-06-04   64,242,892 No Yes 
Basler 
Kantonalbank 
DP Fraud - Tax 2018-08-28   60,400,000 Yes No 
Nichicon 
Corp. 




NP FCPA 2018-05-24   47,029,916 Yes No 
Georgeson, 
LLC 
DP Fraud - 
General 




NP Fraud - 
General 





NP Fraud - 
Health Care     
 35,007,846 No No 
Bumble Bee 
Foods LLC 
plea Antitrust 2017-08-07   25,000,000 No No 
US Imagina, 
LLC 




plea Antitrust 2017-12-14   21,000,000 No No 
Barclays, 
PLC 
declination Fraud - 
Securities 
2018-02-28   12,896,011 Yes Yes 
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plea Antitrust 2018-05-31   12,000,000 No No 
Linde North 
America, Inc. 
& Linde Gas 
North 
America LLC 
declination FCPA 2017-06-16   11,235,000 No No 
Mirelis 
Holding S.A. 




DP Fraud - 
Health Care 
2017-09-22   7,200,000 No No 
Kiekert AG plea Antitrust 2017-06-14  6,159,040 No No 
Bank 
Lombard 
Odier & Co., 
Ltd. 








2017-11-20   5,242,449 No No 






NP Bribery 2017-06-29   5,000,000 No No 
NPB Neue 
Privat Bank 
NP Fraud - Tax   5,000,000 Yes No   
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